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DERIVATIVE LOGIC AND THE BANKING SYSTEM
1. Introduction
This paper tries to develop a fresh view of what it means to analyze the bank­
ing system. We use modern finance theory to disentangle the obvious. The view 
we put forward is suggestive and the idea is that by disentangling the language 
and transforming it into a language of finance, we realize what the liability side 
of a banks balance sheet consists of. In order to get going, we have to review 
both, the Merton model and the put-call parity. The technical details are less 
important than the generał idea of what they convey [Merton, 1974].
2. The put-call parity revisited'
An option starts off with a positive value. The buyer must pay a premium 
and the seller receives this premium. This reflects that the buyer acąuires 
a “right” and the seller has an “obligation”. The terminology of “premiums” 
reflects that we have an insurance-type contract. It remains to be discussed 
how far this analogy should be taken. Before we start, we have to develop our 
notation. Remember that time 0 is today and time T is the expiration of the 
option contract. Furthermore, remember that European calls are only exer-
1 Any textbook in finance will give you such an exposition. See, for example, Kolb [2000] or 
Chance [2003].
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cisable at expiry, while American options can be exercised during the whole 
tenure of the option contract.
SO, ST = price of the underlying asset at time 0 (today) and time T (expira- 
tion),
X = exercise price, 
r = risk-free ratę, 
T = time to expiration, equal to number of days to expiration divided by 
365, 
cO, cT = price of European cali today and at expiration, 
pO, pT = price of European put today and at expiration.
At expiration, a cali option is worth either zero or the difference between the 
underlying price and the exercise price, whichever is greater.
cT = Max (0, ST - X)
At expiration, a put option is worth either zero or the difference between the 
exercise price and the underlying price, whichever is greater.
pT = Max (0, X - ST)
If we buy a cali we talk of being long a cali. If we sell a cali, we are short 
a cali. Similarly, if we buy a put we talk of being long a put. If we sell a put, 
we are short a put.
Exan.ple:
Let us look at the profit and payout diagram on the exercise datę, assuming 
that the exercise price of the share under consideration is $30 and the option
Fig. 1. Long Cali
Source: authors’ own elaboration
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Fig. 2. Short Cali
Source: authors’ own elaboration
Fig. 3. Long Put
Source: authors’ own elaboration
price is $6. Notę that the profit linę includes the cost of the option, while the 
payoff linę ignores it.
It is important to realize at this stage, that the long cali has the upside po- 
tential of the underlying asset, but not the downside potential. The downside 
potential is found in the short put. Buying a cali and selling a put would thus 
mimie a long position in the asset. It is not the same, however, as we did not 
invest in the underlying. Only if we invest the underlying in zero bond with
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Fig. 4. Short Put
Source: authors' own elaboration
maturity equal to the exercise datę and yielding the risk free ratę, both posi- 
tions become equivalent.
We now assume that we buy a cali and a risk free bond, which matures on 
the option expiration day and has a face value equal to the exercise value of 
the cali. Chance [2003] calls this position a “fiduciary cali”, as this strategy 
allows protection against downside losses and thus, preserves Capital. Hence, 
at expiration, if the price of the underlying is bełow X, the cali expires worth- 
less and the bond is worth X. If the price of the underlying is above X, the cali 
expires in the money at the underlying price ST.
We now want to construct what is known as a “protective put” strategy. Here 
we buy the underlying asset and we also buy a put. Again, we participate on 
the upside of the underlying, but the downside is now protected by the put we 
bought. If the price of the underlying is below X at expiry, the put is worth X 
- ST and the underlying is worth ST. If the price of the underlying is above X, 
the put expires worthless and the underlying is worth ST.
What we have seen is, that both strategies, the fiduciary cali and the pro- 
tective put, end up with the same value. In an efficient market, without ar- 
bitrage, their value must be the same. Hence, we can write that the cost of 
the cali plus the cost of the bond equals the cost of the put plus the cost of the 
underlying.
cO + X/(l + r) T = P0 + S0
This equation is called the put-call parity. It shows you how calls, puts, the 
bond and the underlying are related. The equation is also the basis for finan- 
cial engineering. We can now construct a cali by using a put, the underlying
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and the bond. Or we can construct the underlying by using a cali, a put and 
a bond.
Thus, a cali is simply constructed by being long a put, long the underlying 
and short the bond.
cO = pO + SO - X/(l + r) T
A put is constructed by being long a cali, long a bond and short the under­
lying.
pO = cO + X/(l + r) T - SO
The bond can be constructed by being long the put, long the underlying and 
short a cali.
X/(l + r) T = pO + SO - cO
And finally, we construct the underlying by being long the cali, long the 
bond and short the put.
SO = cO + X/(l + r) T - pO
These synthetic positions allow us to price options, they also allow us to 
find mis-pricings and thus to arbitrage. For our purposes in this paper, it is 
important to know these relationships and be familiar with the terminology 
employed.
3. Applying the Language of the Merton Model
In this part we want to present the basics of Merton’ s 1974 model of a firm’ 
s debt. We follow the common exposition by Crouhy et al. [2001].




The p denotes the mean and o2 the variance of the instantaneous ratę of 
return on the asset of the firm. Merton also assumes that the firm has a simple 
Capital structure. It is financed by eąuity St and a single zero-coupon debt, 
maturing at time T, with a face value of F and a market value of Bt. Thus, the 
value of the assets of the firm is denoted by Vt.
He then shows that if the value of the assets falls below Bt, the firm goes 
into default and St is worthless. Thinking back to our options, above, holding
12-
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Fig. 5. The balance sheet of a firm under the Merton Model (1974)
Source: authors’ own elaboration on the basie of [Merton, 1974]
Assets Liabilities
• Assets of the firm, 
such as inventory, fixed 
assests, etc.
• Bt - a zero-coupon 
debt instrument
• St - equity
St is like holding a cali on the assets of the firm. It has upward potential with 
when the value of the assets is above Bt and otherwise, in the case of default, 
St expires worthless. Being long Bt is similar to selling a put or being short 
a put: The premium is the interest on the debt, while the value is determined 
by the value of the assets of the firm.
Merton goes on to calculate the critical asset value below default occurs. 
Credit risk in this framework is a function of the financial structure of the 
firm. Thus, the higher the leverage of a firm turns out to be, the higher the 
probability that this firm will default.
Conseąuences
Thus, holding a share of a company can be compared with being long a cali 
in that company. Similarly, a bank loan is from the perspective of the bank 
nothing but a short put. The loan book of a bank or the loan portfolio is thus 
a portfolio of short puts. From the perspective of an investor of a bank this 
would imply that buying a share of a bank is being long a cali written on 
a portfolio of short puts. Before we move on, however, we should take a look at 
the different banking systems. Economies of transition reflect the Continental 
banking system And this not by coincidence, simply because there is a lack of 
functioning Capital markets.
4. Stylized differences of the Continental
and Anglo-Saxon banking systems
This part of the paper attempts to look at the stylized differences in the 
two banking systems. The emphasis lies on stylized. The Continental banking 
system is usually called the “German” banking system. This terminology is 
misleading, however, as most countries on the continent - including the CEE 
countries - display the same characteristics. We think about France, Italy, 
Spain, but also Poland and Austria. If we define the financial market as be­
ing the sum of the Capital markets, the banking system and other financial
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intermediaries, such as Insurance companies, then it seems fair to say that 
(traditionally) the financial markets in Continental Europę are bank-driven 
or bank-based. The economies finance themselves largely via bank debt and 
only to some extent via the Capital market (corporate bonds or the issuance of 
eąuity). Continental banks used to earn their money by the spread between 
interest paid on deposits and earned on the issuance of corporate loans. Only 
in recent years did we witness a move towards commission income. Companies 
tended to have one or morę “house banks”, which would issue long-term loans 
and would involve themselves in the companies, usually by sitting in super- 
visory committees. These loans would carry a fixed interest ratę, rather than 
a floating one. Furthermore, banks would assume eąuity stakes in companies 
and be engaged and bound together in what seemed to be a long-run relation- 
ship. Companies were thus able to avoid the Capital market and so there was 
less need for transparency, corporate governance codes. Interest rates on loans 
were usually set at a specific ratę above the interest paid on deposits and they 
were seldom linked to the actual risk associated with a particular loan. Thus, 
especially in Austria and Germany, the economies displayed and still display 
a large number of smali and medium-sized companies (SME’s), the so-called 
Mittelstand, a phenomenon which has vanished almost in the Anglo-Saxon 
world. Does this banking system cross-subsidize the SME’ s? Given the debate 
about Basel II, it would seem so, as loans - not being related to the underlying 
risks - were too cheap. Notę also that the system is rather built on long-term 
issues: the interest ratę is fixed, loans are long-term, etc. Is this system better 
prepared to weather storms compared to the morę short-term approach of the 
Anglo-Saxon system? The answer seems to depend on the length of the storm. 
If the storm is rather short, the banking system helps to stabilize the economy, 
as the refinancing of the economy is assured. However, if the storm turns out 
to be prolonged, as it does currently, long-term loan after long-term loan goes 
into default, the mis-pricing of loans becomes apparent and the whole banking 
system seems to falter, as it currently does in Germany, especially those banks 
with the highest credit exposures such as the HVB Group. The stylized balance 
sheet of this form of bank-based financial market summarizes this story.
Furthermore, we might want to highlight the structure of the financial 
system by using the concept of the financing box. The financing box shows the 
structure of the financial system and the comparative importance of its parts. 
One of the crucial sectors of the economy is the structure of the financial in­
termediaries. Financial intermediaries link the monetary and the real sphere. 
Depending on how these institutions are structured, monetary policies trickle 
through to the real sphere. Notę that theoretical economies has not much to say 
about the institutions of the financial sector. Beyond the link between the mon­
etary and the real sphere of the economy, financial intermediaries finance the 
economy. Economic growth has to be financed and this role lies on the shoulders
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Fig. 6. Bank based financial system: Continental banking system 
Source: authors’ own elaboration
Assets Liabilities
• Long term loan facili- 
ties, often unquoted and 
unrated companies
• Shareholdings and 
cross-holdings





of financial institutions. They are the source of growth. One of the lessons we 
can draw from the transition experience in Central Europę is the dependence 
of economic policies on the financial system of a country. Consider the follow- 
ing example: an interest ratę drop in the UK has a completely different effect 
on the economy than a decline in interest rates in the Euro zonę. The reason 
can be found in the different financial systems of the two countries, or what we 
cali the workings of the “financing box”. British consumers are to a large extent 
home-owners, financed via a flexible ratę mortgage. Thus, a decrease or increase 
of interest rates by the Bank of England has an inunediate effect on consumer 
spending. Thus, the effects of monetary policy are different from the continent, 
for example. This example also questions the viability of one monetary exchange 
ratę for countries with completely different financing boxes.
The financing box describes the financial system: Capital markets, banking 
system and other financial markets and sits in between the monetary policies 
and the microeconomic policies of a country. The effectiveness of these policies 
should be seen as dependent on the financing box. The following ąuestions 
drop out of the visualization:
- What effects do monetary policies have depending on the structure of the 
financing box?
- What type of monetary policy is possible (OMO versus reserve reąuire- 
ment)?
- How important are Capital markets in financing the economy?
- How important is the banking system in financing the economy?
- How important are other financial institutions in shaping the Capital 
market and in financing the economy?
- Depending on these three elements of the box, how should we effectively 
regulate the financial system?
- If regulation or legislation is exogenously imposed (EU or Basel II), how 
does it affect and change the three parts of the box?
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- What effects do microeconomic policies have depending on the structure 
of the financing box?
- Given the above, what does this imply for the risk management of finan- 
cial institutions?
Fig. 7. Capital market based financial system: Anglo-Saxon system
Source: authors’ own elaboration
Let’ s now move on to the stylized Anglo-Saxon banking system. Here we 
would include countries such as the United States, Great Britain, but also to 
some extent The Netherlands. Commission income dominates the earnings of 
banks. Banks act as intermediaries between corporate clients and the Capi­
tal market. Thus, they take on risks for a short time, being an underwriter 
of equity or debt issues. They charge a commission for taking on that risk. 
Companies finance themselves via the Capital market and demand investment 
banking services. Furthermore, companies demand credit lines, but these often 
only act as a form of collateral or security for Capital market debt instruments, 
such as commercial paper. The credit lines are usually structured as revolvers
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(short-term revolving or automatic revolvers), and the interest rates are thus 
flexible. In generał, loans tend to be short-term. The clients - as they rely on 
the Capital markets - tend to be ąuoted companies and are often rated by rating 
agencies. Banks have few long-term eąuity holdings and try to use securitiza- 
tion to trim down their balance sheet. The Anglo-Saxon banking system is 
summarized in the balance sheet and financing box below.
Fig. 8. Financing Box for a bank-based financial system
Source: authors’ own elaboration
Assets Liabilities
• Short term loan facilities, often 
revolvers
• Often ąuoted and rated companies
• Few long-term eąuity holdings
• Floating ratę debt




Fig. 9. Financing Box for a Capital market-based financial system 
Source: authors’ own elaboration
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5. Conclusion
In this paper, we discussed the structure of stylized banking systems. We 
have distinguished between the Continental or German banking system and 
the Anglo-Saxon banking system. We have argued that the banking systems 
in CEE resemble the Continental banking system and we have shown, that 
there are many institutional reasons, why the existence of Continental banking 
systems is no random occurrence. In fact, given the structure, legał system 
and Information inefficiencies, plus the non-existing strength of the local 
investors, it seems optimal to finance an emerging economy in such a way. 
Given the Capital structure and needs of international regulation, this will 
put pressure on the balance sheets of the CEE banks. It remains for another 
paper to discuss the alternative ways of risk transfer and to argue, that asset 
backed securities seem especially suited to transfer risk out of local markets 
and local banks to the international investor. This would take advantage of 
the Anglo-Saxon banking system, which dominates the developed financial 
systems. Indeed, an international investor, holding a portfolio of CEE banks 
is in an ideał position to structure CEE asset backed securities to intermediate 
risk of his portfolio of short puts. Thus, the comparative advantages of both 
financial systems are optimized.
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